initial information and equilibrium prices. In addition, there is the possibility that such an equilibrium might not even exist. In particular, one can give examples in which, if the trader must have perfect knowledge of the relationship between initial information and equilibrium prices, then a rational expectations equilibrium need not exist, even with "standard" assumptions about preferences, endowments, etc.2 However, in this paper I shall show that, if the number of alternative states of initial information is finite, then the nonexistence of equilibrium with perfect market models is an "accident," in that it requires special combinations of parameters of the system that are "negligible" in the whole parameter space, in a suitable sense. This situation may be summarized by the statement that "existence of rational expectations equilibrium is generic."
The proof of generic existence that I shall present demonstrates in addition a remarkable information efficiency property of equilibrium. Generically, in the model considered here, a rational expectations equilibrium reveals to all traders the information possessed by all of the traders taken together.3 Seen in a broader context, this property of equilibrium might cast doubt on the incentives for a trader to obtain information about the environment prior to entering the market, provided he could count on other traders obtaining the same information, which would then be revealed by market prices. But if each trader reasoned in this way, then no trader would obtain prior information, and so there would be no prior information for market prices to reveal! However, to examine this question more carefully one needs a model that reflects the dynamics of market adjustment and price formation. 4 Another approach would be to explore the case in which traders have models of market price determination that are imperfect or imprecise, but that are consistent with observations of the market during the process of model revision or "learning." This approach will be followed in a subsequent paper. 5 The concept of rational expectations equilibrium has also received considerable attention in the macroeconomic literature (see Shiller [15] for a review). However, no attempt will be made here to relate the present paper to that literature.
The proof of the main result of the present paper, on the generic existence and informational efficiency of rational expectations equilibrium, is based on an auxiliary proposition that has some independent interest. Roughly speaking, this auxiliary proposition concerns the comparison of ordinary exchange equilibria under uncertainty in which traders have (subjective) probability beliefs about the 2Nonexistence of rational expectations equilibrium may be caused by a discontinuity in the market demand functions that can arise when traders use market prices to infer something about other traders' information. This discontinuity was pointed out in Radner [13] , where conditions for the Pareto optimality of rational expectations equilibrium were discussed. Specific examples of nonexistence of equilibrium have been given in Green [4] and Kreps [11] ; a further discussion of existence can be found in Jordan [7, 8] . 3 Conditions under which equilibrium prices reveal traders' initial information have been explored in Green [3] , Grossman [5] , Grossman and Stiglitz [6] , and Kihlstrom and Mirman [10] . 4 See Beja [1] for a step in this direction. 5 See Radner [14] .
payoff-relevant state of the environment. The proposition gives conditions under which, generically, two exchange economies that differ only in the traders' probability distributions will have different equilibrium prices. Since the argument leading to the main result (Section 3) is fairly long, I shall give a heuristic sketch in this introductory section.
Pure Exchange under Uncertainty
Consider first a pure exchange economy. The decision problem for trader i is to choose a vector of assets, which will be called his portfolio. The eventual utility to i of his portfolio is uncertain at the time he purchases it. This is expressed by saying that his utility depends on his portfolio and on the environment (which is exogenous). Each trader has a subjective probability distribution on the set of alternative environments, and we suppose that his criterion for choosing among alternative portfolios is expected utility. Given his initial endowment of assets, and given a vector of asset prices, he will demand a portfolio that maximizes his expected utility subject to the budget constraint that the cost of his portfolio not exceed the value of his initial endowment. For simplicity, I shall suppose that only nonnegative portfolios are allowed (no short sales). His excess demand is the vector of differences between the assets he demands and his initial endowments. Suppose that his utility function is sufficiently regular so that, for any vector of prices, his excess demand is unique. Let p denote the vector of assets prices, let X denote the array of subjective probability distributions of the environment (one for each trader), and let Z(p, I) denote the corresponding total excess demand, i.e. the (vector) sum of the individual traders' excess demands. Given a probability array x, an equilibrium is a price vector for which the total excess demand is zero, i.e. a solution p of the equation system In other words, for a confounding pair of probability arrays, there exists a single price vector that is an equilibrium for each of them. On the other hand, if a pair of probability arrays is not confounding, then any corresponding pair of equilibrium price vectors will be distinct.
It is easy to give examples of "textbook" utility functions for which confounding pairs of probability arrays exist (see Section 2). However, since the equation system (1.2) has more equations than unknowns, it would seem plausible that, if the equations were in "general position" then no solution would exist. To make this idea precise, assume that the set E of alternative states of the environment is finite; then a probability distribution on E can be represented as a point in a vector space of dimension # E -1, where # E denotes the number of states in E (recall that the probabilities must sum to unity). A probability array can be represented by a point in a space of dimension I( # E -1), where I is the number of traders, and the set Ho of pairs of probability arrays lies in a space of dimension 2I( # E -1). The equation system (1.2) is thus parameterized by points in Ho.
Since asset prices are relative, it will be understood that they are to be normalized, say by taking the sum to be unity. Hence, if there are n assets, there are (n -1) independent prices, so (1.2) has 2(n -1) unknowns (for every parameter point in Ho). On the other hand, there are nominally 3n equations in (1.2). However, if the utility functions are such that every budget is exhausted, then the value of excess demand will always be zero, even out of equilibrium (Walras's law). Furthermore, as noted above, there are only (n -1) independent prices, so the condition Pi = P2 represents only (n -1) independent equations. Hence there are at most 3(n -1) independent equations in (1.2). This is still larger than the number of unknowns, however, so that one would not typically expect (1.2) to have a solution.
Call a subset of H0 negligible if its closure has Lebesgue measure zero. The auxilliary proposition gives conditions under which the set of confounding pairs of probability arrays is negligible. In terms of the equation system (1.2), this conclusion can be interpreted as follows. Let Co be the set of confounding pairs in H0, and let C0 be the closure of Co in H0. If a parameter point is in Co (i.e. confounding), then every neighborhood of it has a parameter point for which (1.2) has no solution. In other words, for a parameter point in C0 there exist arbitrarily small perturbations of the system (1.2), i.e. arbitrarily small perturbations of the parameter point, for which the equations have no solution. On the other hand, if a parameter point is not in Co (and is therefore not confounding), then there is some neighborhood of it such that for all points in the neighborhood the system (1.2) has no solution. (In addition, there may be points of C0 that are not confounding, i.e. not in C0.)
In another terminology, if a property holds except on a negligible set, one says that it holds generically. In this terminology, the conclusion of the auxillary proposition is that, generically, different probability arrays give rise to different equilibrium prices.
Full Communication Equilibria and Revealing Prices
At the next stage in the analysis, I introduce the concepts of full communication equilibrium and revealing prices. Consider a pure exchange situation similar to the one just described, except that before the market activity takes place some exogenous information about the environment is made available to all the traders.
To express the idea that this information may be incomplete or noisy, let s denote the information signal, and suppose that every trader has a subjective joint probability distribution of the signal s and the environment e. (Strictly speaking, since the exogenous information signal s is also part of the traders' environment, one should now call e the payoff-relevant part of the environment (see J. Marschak [12] ), but for simplicity I shall continue to call e the environment.) Given the information signal s, each trader's preferences among portfolios will be determined by his conditional expected utility, using his conditional probability distribution of e given s. Denote trader i's conditional distribution of e given s by (the vector) vi, and for each s denote the array ( Thus each trader may have only a part of the total information available. Each trader i has a subjective joint probability distribution of s and e.
As a preliminary thought experiment, imagine that, given his information signal si, each trader chose among portfolios according to his conditional expected utility, using his conditional probability distribution of e given si. This would generate an excess demand function for each trader i, given si, and thus would generate a total excess demand function for all traders, given s. An "exogenous information equilibrium" price vector, given s, would be one for which this total excess demand would be zero. For each s let X (s) be a corresponding exogenous equilibrium price vector, and suppose that every trader behaves in such a way that +(s) is in fact the market price if s is realized and each trader i observes si. Now imagine that, after a number of independent realizations of this situation, a particular trader, say number 1, becomes "sophisticated" and realizes that there is a regular relationship between the total information signal and the market price; this relationship is, of course, described by the mapping p. Trader 1 would then be able to infer something about the total information signals from his observations of the market price, X (s) (unless, of course, the market price were the same for all s). This would change his excess demand function, since the market price would not only enter his budget constraint, but would also provide a supplementary signal-in addition to his exogenous signal si-on which to condition his expected utility. But if his excess demand were not an insignificant part of the total, this "sophisticated" behavior would change the total excess demand function, too, which would change the relation 0 between total exogenous information and market price! In fact, if all traders became sophisticated in this manner, then the original exogenous equilibrium price vectors k (s) would typically no longer clear the market given the total exogenous information signal s. What would be required would be a "forecast function" k that would be self-fulfilling.
These preliminary considerations motivate the following formal definitions. A forecast function X is a mapping that associates with each total exogenous information signal s a price vector X (s). Given a forecast function X, suppose that each trader i chooses among portfolios according to his conditional expected utility given the (augmented) information [si, k(s)].
This behavior will generate, for each total signal and each trader an excess demand; call the resulting total excess demand the sophisticated excess demand. It should be emphasized that this sophisticated excess demand depends on the forecast function X and on the particular total signal s; denote it by ;(s, k). A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is a forecast function such that the corresponding sophisticated excess demand is zero for every total information signal, i.e. a function k such that In our present terminology, the FCE k is a particular forecast function. Recall that k is revealing if it is one-to-one. Suppose that the FCE were revealing; then for every trader and every total information signal s, the conditional probability distribution of e given 4(s) would be the same as the conditional probability distribution of e given s. Hence the sophisticated demand of trader i given si and + (s) would equal his ordinary demand given s. By the equilibrium property of X, the ordinary total excess demand, given that every trader knows s and that the price vector is + (s), is zero. It follows that the FCE X is a forecast function that satisfies (1.5). Thus we see that a revealing full communication equilibrium is a rational expectations equilibrium.
One can now state the main result about REE's as a corollary of the preceding observation and the auxillary proposition: Under the assumptions of the auxillary proposition, generically, there exists a rational expectations equilibrium that is revealing.
In Section 2, I provide a simple example that illustrates the concepts and the main results. Section 3 contains a systematic presentation of all of the results and their proofs. In the course of proving the main results, it is necessary to prove that the excess demand function is generically differentiable in prices and parameters at equilibrium (Lemma 1); the method used may be applicable to other models. The assumptions are discussed in some detail in Section 4.
AN EXAMPLE
An example in which the equilibrium can be explicitly calculated illustrates the 6 problems that will be considered in subsequent sections.
Suppose that there are only two assets being traded. Trader i's initial endowment will be denoted by wi = (ti, vi) and his final portfolio by xi = (yi, zi). The (normalized) price vector is p = (q, 1 -q). Suppose further that trader i's utility function is of the "Cobb-Douglas" form:
ui(xi, ai) ai log yi +(1-ai) log zi, 0<ai < 1. Call these the unsophisticated equilibrium prices. Note that this includes the full communication equilibrium as a special case, when K is empty. To introduce the third equilibrium concept, imagine that in the process of approaching the second equilibrium by means of a tatonnement process, the uninformed traders realize that the equilibrium price should reflect the information that the informed traders possess. The possibility of inferring something about the informed traders' information from the market price rests, of course, on knowing how the market price would differ in the two states of the environment, but this relationship is endogenous to the market system. Thus, define the third equilibrium as a pair of prices, say (q', q"), such that if every trader expects q' to be the market price in state 1 and q" to be the price in state 2, and if each trader maximizes his conditional expected utility, conditioned on both his own initial information and the market price, then excess demand will be zero in each state. Call this a rational expectations equilibrium.
In this example there are two possibilities for a rational expectations equilibrium (q', q"): either (i) q' and q" are unequal, or (ii) they are equal. In the first case initially uninformed traders (those in K) can infer the state of the environment from the market price, so that, conditional on the market price, all traders become informed. In this case, I shall say that the equilibrium prices are revealing. Therefore in case (i) (2.9) q'=" = q "q ; the equilibrium prices must be the same as those in the first, full communication equilibrium.
In the second case, initially uninformed traders cannot infer the state of the environment from the market price, so that, conditional on the market price, each trader's information is the same as in the unsophisticated equilibrium, (2. Table I, as in Table II . Thus, except for a closed set of Lebesque measure zero in the parameter space, a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) exists, is unique, and is identical in outcomes with the full communication equilibria. The sets for which no REE exists (III) and two REE exist (IV) are each of dimension one less than that of the parameter space, and the set for which the unique equilibrium does not reveal the state of the environment to the initially uninformed traders is "least likely" of all, having dimension two less than that of the parameter space.
In a more general setting, each trader would have some initial information about the environment, and the market price would depend at most on the initial information available jointly to all the traders. Corresponding to the above full communication equilibria would be equilibria in which all traders were provided in common all the information that was jointly available to them initially; call these also full communication equilibria. The analysis of this example suggests the conjecture7 that, under much more general conditions, a REE will have the same outcomes as the full communication equilibria, except for a "small" set in the space of parameters of the market system. This conjecture is proved in Section 3, in the context of a more general model, under the condition that the set of alternative states of initial information is finite.
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND FULL COMMUNICATION EQUILIBRIA
In this section I show that, in the context of a particular model of asset trading, the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium that is also a revealing full communication equilibrium is generic. In other words, except for a negligible set of points in the parameter space of the economy, rational expectations equilibria exist that reveal to all traders all the available information.
Consider ci + q 'zi : cl) z+ q'wi Wi. 7 As far as I know, this idea is essentially due to Michael Rothschild. ? Vectors will ordinarily be understood to be columns, and their transpose will be denoted by a prime. N-dimensional Euclidean space will be denoted by RN, its nonnegative orthant by R+N, and its Before formally specifying each trader's behavior, let ei4, (q) provisionally denote trader i's demand, given the asset price vector q, and his signal si, and let Z,(q) provisionally denote the total market excess demand for assets. Suppose that every trader's demand satisfies his budget constraint (3.1) with equality; then, by Walras's Law, zero excess demand for assets implies zero excess demand for current consumption. Therefore, q is an equilibrium (asset) price vector, given s, if Z.(q)=O.
Suppose that there were a rule for choosing a single equilibrium q in the case of multiple equilibria; then for every s there would be a well-defined equilibrium price vector, say qs = 4 (s). In this circumstance, any trader knowing the function k would be able to infer that s is in the inverse image, +k (q), of q, and might be expected to evaluate his expected utility conditional both on si and on s in +-l(q).
This motivates the following definition of rational expectations equilibrium. Call a function from S to R a forecast function. Given a forecast function X, and given a price vector q and a joint signal s, trader i's demand is a (c, z) that maximizes his conditional expected utility 
It is immediate that if q is a FCE and satisfies (3.5), then it satisfies (3.4). Thus, a full communication equilibrium that is revealing is a rational expectations equilibrium.
With this observation in mind, let us turn to the examination of conditions under which a FCE is revealing. For any trader i, any joint signal s, and environment e, let 11ise denote i's conditional probability of e, given s; let uris denote the probability vector with coordinates (ITise); let 7Tr denote the array (7Tis), i = 1, . . . , I; and let 7r denote9 the array ( 9 Warning: the symbol 7r will always be used to denote an array of probability vectors, but at different points in the paper the arrays may be of different dimension. The proper dimension of 7r will, of course, be indicated in each context. 10 For a vector or matrix x, x 0 0 means that every element of x is nonnegative; x > 0 means that x ; 0 and x #0 ; x >> 0 means that every element of x is strictly positive.
(A3) (a) E has more than K elements (##E>K), every set of K vectors ve spans RK, and every ve >> 0; (b) at equilibrium, for every i, there exists no x in R K such that for every e (v x)U (v'zi) = 1.
In particular part (b) of (A3) rules out the logarithmic utility function U1(y)= log y. It will be shown to follow from part (a) that the expected utility function is strictly concave in the portfolio vector z.
Equilibrium under Uncertainty is Sensitive to the Probabilities
The proof that, generically, a FCE is revealing can be based on an, auxillary proposition about ordinary equilibrium under uncertainty, which has some independent interest. Let irr and T2 be two probability arrays in PI where P denotes the set of all probability vectors (pe), i.e. the set of all probability distributions on E. Looking at the system of equations (3.7), one sees that one wants conditions under which the following system has no solution: Also, both DU and D2U are continuous. By (3.12) and (3.13), U is strictly increasing and strictly concave in z. Also, UO is strictly increasing and strictly concave in c. Hence, for any given positive prices, a trader's demand will be unique, and the budget constraint will be satisfied with equality.
I now turn to the study of the properties of total excess demand. I normalize the price of consumption to be unity. Since every individual trader's budget constraint is satisfied with equality, the value of total excess demand for assets and current consumption is zero, and an equilibrium for the probability array 7r in PI is characterized by Z(q, 7rr) = 0. By standard methods one can show that equilibrium exists. In equilibrium, all asset prices will be strictly positive.
With the present model, an individual's demand function need not be everywhere differentiable in prices and probabilities. By Assumption (A2), at equilibrium the total demand for every asset is positive, but a particular trader's demand for a particular asset could be zero. In such a case, his demand for that asset would typically have a discontinuity in the derivative with respect to prices and/or probabilities at a point at which the demand for that asset just falls to zero. We shall see that the set of points in PI at which this can happen in equilibrium is negligible.
LEMMA 1:
There is an open subset . of PI whose complement in PI has Legesgue measure zero, and such that, for every rr in . and every corresponding equilibrium price vector q, the excess demand function Z is continuously differentiable in both arguments in a neighborhood of (q, 7rr).
(The proof of Lemma 1 will be deferred to the end of this section.) To continue with the proof of the Proposition, define the mapping F from L=R2K+ X&(2 to R3K by Z (q-q, 7i  (3.14) F(qi, q2, '7T1 1 r2)3 Z(q2, 1r2) . Recall that H is the set of all probability arrays (Trise).
COROLLARY: Except for a negligible subset C of H, for every probability array in H every corresponding full communication equilibrium is revealing.
(I omit the proof of the Corollary; see the Introduction.) The main theorem is now an immediate consequence of the Corollary and the observation that every revealing FCE is a REE.
THEOREM: Except for a negligible subset C of H, for every probability array in H there is a corresponding rational expectations equilibrium that is revealing.
Note that the Theorem does not exclude the possibility that there are points both in C and outside it that have a nonrevealing REE.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1:
The technique is similar to that used to prove the Proposition. 13 
COMMENTS ON THE ASSUMPTIONS
The basic proposition of this paper is that generically, i.e., except for a negligible set of economies that satisfy the assumptions of the model, there exists a rational expectations equilibrium whose prices are "revealing," i.e. reveal to all market agents all the information initially available to all the agents. My comments on the assumptions address two issues: (i) Does Assumption 3 characterize a set of economies whose complement is negligible in the broader set of economies that otherwise fit the formulation of the model and satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2? (ii) How important is the requirement of the model that the sets of information signals be finite?
To begin the discussion of the first issue, let me recall that there are really two sets of assumptions. One set is implicit in the formulation of the model, the other is described in Assumptions 1-3. Given the formulation of the model, the following objects comprise the data of a particular economy:
( Turning to Assumption A3(b), one would hope that, with additional regularity conditions on the utility functions, this assumption would be satisfied for all but a negligible set of economies in any given set A' (provided H > K and Assumptions Al and A2 are also satisfied). However, I have no result of this kind at present.
To conclude the discussion of the first issue, let me suggest that for some purposes the model has allowed the set H of arrays (iTise) to be too large. Suppose that all traders agree on the conditional probabilities of (joint) signals s given environments e, but have possibly different "prior" probabilities for the environments. In this case the dimension of H would be smaller, and the demonstration that a set is negligible in H would be a sharper result.
I turn now to the second issue: is it important that the sets of information signals be finite? The first thing to note is that one cannot expect in general that equilibrium prices will be revealing if the signal sets are "too large." For example, if the sets of signals were Euclidean spaces, and the equilibrium prices were smooth functions of the joint signal, then the equilibrium prices could not be revealing if the dimension of the joint signal exceeded the number of commodities.
Whether or not rational expectations equilibria exist generically, in some fairly general model, is an open question. If the sets of signals are not finite, then H1 is infinite dimensional. In this case, the concept of "negligible" set in H is not straightforward; there will typically be a choice of natural topologies on H, and there may be no natural measure corresponding to Lebesgue measure. J. Green [4] has given an example with infinite signal spaces in which no rational expectations equilibrium exists, and stimulated by Green's example Jordan and Radner [9] have constructed an example with infinite E and S in which the set of economies (suitably topologized) for which no rational expectations equilibrium exists has a nonempty interior.
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